HUGO CHAVEZ'S VENEZUELA: SHOWING TRUE COLOURS
THE ECONOMIST, December 21, 2010
THE ECONOMIST, December 21, 2010
WHEN the opposition to Hugo Chávez’s radical leftist government won a majority of votes in a legislative election this September, its leaders hoped the result would slow Venezuela’s slide towards dictatorship. But the message Mr Chávez seems to have received is that he will have to become even more authoritarian to hold power. In recent days, the president’s allies in the outgoing congress have rushed to approve a package of laws that virtually eliminate the country’s last vestiges of checks and balances and protection for civil liberties.
Shortly after Mr Chávez took office in 1999, he won approval of a new constitution with a strict division of powers and many progressive human-rights provisions. It did not take long for him to tire of such safeguards. In 2007 he proposed a “socialist” reform that would have turned Venezuela into a near-dictatorship. Voters turned it down in a referendum. But he has since managed to implement much of what was rejected, including incorporating his political militia into the military; eliminating the autonomy of the central bank; and winning a subsequent referendum to abolish term limits.
The most recent victims of Mr Chávez’s onslaught are the national parliament and local governments. Ever since his rivals unwisely boycotted a legislative election in 2005, Mr Chávez has enjoyed a rubber-stamp congress. He is taking no chances with the new parliament, which will take office on January 5th and includes a significant opposition presence. On December 17th, his allies passed an “enabling law” that will let him rule by decree on almost all significant issues for the next 18 months—rendering the new legislature a virtually irrelevant talking-shop before the new members even have a chance to warm their seats.
The president is also sidelining local governments. He has already diverted funds from state and municipal authorities for years. Now, he has undermined them entirely via five “popular power” laws establishing the socialist “commune”—a new administrative body, run by the executive, which ignores existing local boundaries—as the basic unit of government.
Mr Chávez is cracking down on civil rights as well. Finishing off their productive lame-duck session, his congressional allies will soon approve a series of bills dubbed the “Cuban package” by opponents. It includes drastic restrictions on freedom of speech, including control of the internet; an end to university autonomy; a virtual ban on the foreign funding of NGOs; and dismissal for members of the legislature wishing to switch sides. The president’s tolerance for dissent was made clear when unidentified thugs attacked students and activists who were protesting outside the parliament building against the new laws, using sticks, stones, bottles and even plastic traffic cones. None of them has been brought to justice.
Outsiders have taken note. The Inter-American Human Rights Commission said it deplored a “serious setback for freedom of expression”. The government, as is its wont, dismissed such criticism as a foreign-funded destabilisation plot. Mr Chávez has said the enabling law is necessary to respond to recent floods that have left tens of thousands homeless. It remains unclear exactly how his new special powers involving national defence or telecommunications, for example, will help re-house them.
Mr Chávez’s heavy-handed reaction to a fairly modest setback—his party will keep its legislative majority despite losing the popular vote—bodes poorly for how he might handle a loss in the 2012 presidential election. The military, he said recently, might well not tolerate an opposition government, and Venezuela’s senior general added that the armed forces were “wedded” to the chavista project.
If the president’s slow-motion coup is not enough to keep him in power, might he resort to the more traditional kind? History gives reason to worry. Mr Chávez first made his name as the leader of a failed coup in 1992. He celebrates its anniversary every year.
Shortly after Mr Chávez took office in 1999, he won approval of a new constitution with a strict division of powers and many progressive human-rights provisions. It did not take long for him to tire of such safeguards. In 2007 he proposed a “socialist” reform that would have turned Venezuela into a near-dictatorship. Voters turned it down in a referendum. But he has since managed to implement much of what was rejected, including incorporating his political militia into the military; eliminating the autonomy of the central bank; and winning a subsequent referendum to abolish term limits.
The most recent victims of Mr Chávez’s onslaught are the national parliament and local governments. Ever since his rivals unwisely boycotted a legislative election in 2005, Mr Chávez has enjoyed a rubber-stamp congress. He is taking no chances with the new parliament, which will take office on January 5th and includes a significant opposition presence. On December 17th, his allies passed an “enabling law” that will let him rule by decree on almost all significant issues for the next 18 months—rendering the new legislature a virtually irrelevant talking-shop before the new members even have a chance to warm their seats.
The president is also sidelining local governments. He has already diverted funds from state and municipal authorities for years. Now, he has undermined them entirely via five “popular power” laws establishing the socialist “commune”—a new administrative body, run by the executive, which ignores existing local boundaries—as the basic unit of government.
Mr Chávez is cracking down on civil rights as well. Finishing off their productive lame-duck session, his congressional allies will soon approve a series of bills dubbed the “Cuban package” by opponents. It includes drastic restrictions on freedom of speech, including control of the internet; an end to university autonomy; a virtual ban on the foreign funding of NGOs; and dismissal for members of the legislature wishing to switch sides. The president’s tolerance for dissent was made clear when unidentified thugs attacked students and activists who were protesting outside the parliament building against the new laws, using sticks, stones, bottles and even plastic traffic cones. None of them has been brought to justice.
Outsiders have taken note. The Inter-American Human Rights Commission said it deplored a “serious setback for freedom of expression”. The government, as is its wont, dismissed such criticism as a foreign-funded destabilisation plot. Mr Chávez has said the enabling law is necessary to respond to recent floods that have left tens of thousands homeless. It remains unclear exactly how his new special powers involving national defence or telecommunications, for example, will help re-house them.
Mr Chávez’s heavy-handed reaction to a fairly modest setback—his party will keep its legislative majority despite losing the popular vote—bodes poorly for how he might handle a loss in the 2012 presidential election. The military, he said recently, might well not tolerate an opposition government, and Venezuela’s senior general added that the armed forces were “wedded” to the chavista project.
If the president’s slow-motion coup is not enough to keep him in power, might he resort to the more traditional kind? History gives reason to worry. Mr Chávez first made his name as the leader of a failed coup in 1992. He celebrates its anniversary every year.
No hay comentarios:
Publicar un comentario